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SIQDY  ON  THE  ADVANTAGES  AND  DRAWBACKS  FOR  IHE  EVROP£AN  COMMUNITY  OF  THE 
INTRODUCTION  OF  A SYSTEM  OF  "COMMON  CABRIER"  FQR  THE  IRANSPORT  OF  NATURAL 
GAS 
In response  to your letter of 19  December  1988  setting out your 
comments  on our Draft Final Report,  we  have  great pleasure in submitting, 
as  requested,  twenty-five  (25)  copies  of'our Final Report.  We  have 
incorporated your various  comments  and suggestions  and have,  as  agreed, 
prepared the  Executive  Summary  as  a  separate document. 
We  have  very much  appreciated the  opportunity of working with you  on 
this  important study and  look forward  to hearing  from  you if you wish us  to 
present our conclusions  to  Commission staff (from within or outside 
DG  XVII)  or if we  may  be  of any  further assistance  to you  in the  future. 
Yours  sincerely 
W.I.M.  Goskirk 
Director,  Oil & Gas 
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P<cmtroe Coun  Lo,_, EC4.A  4HT 
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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
I  Introduction to  common  carriage 
1.1  The  purpose  of this study is  to  identify the  principal advantages  and 
drawbacks  for  the  European  Community  of a  common  carriage  system for  the 
transportation of natural gas.  Common  carriage  is  interpreted to mean  a 
qualified legal obligation on  the  owners  of gas  pipeline and storage 
facilities  to  provide  transportation and related services  for  third parties 
in return for  a  reasonable  fee,  subject to  the  availability of sufficient 
unused capacity to  allow  them  to  do  so.  The  possibility of introducing 
such a  system at the  Community  level  is identified as  a  priority area for 
consideration in the  Commission's  recent Working  Document  COM(88)  238 
entitled "The  Internal Energy Market"  and  is located within the  overall 
framework  of moves  to  complete  the  internal market by  1992. 
1.2  The  main arguments  in favour  of common  carriage are  to subject the 
gas  industry to greater gas-on-gas  competition and  to  allow consumers 
increased freedom of choice  among  gas  suppliers  and among  differing terms 
of supply,  including the extent of supply security.  Arguments  against 
common  carriage relate principally to  incentives  for  new  investment  in 
supply capacity and possible adverse  consequences  for overall gas  supply 
security.  An  assessment of these potential advantages  and drawbacks 
requires  a  degree  of  informed judgement  - primarily regarding  the  extent  to 
which  competition might  emerge  and  the effect which  this might have  on  the 
costs of supplying gas  to  consumers.  For  reasons  discussed at greater 
length below,  the  key  issues  are not susceptible to  the  sort of 
quantitative analysis which  might be  appropriate  in relation to  the 
possibility of common  carriage in electricity,  for  example. 
1.3  Within the  gas  sector,  common  carriage itself is just one  of the 
priority issues  for consideration identified in the Working  Document.  As 
the  document  implies,  there are  a  number  of essential prerequisites for the 
introduction of free  and effective circulation of natural  gas  within the 
Community,  via common  carriage  transportation.  In our view,  these  include 
the  termination of statutory monopolies,  exclusive  rights,  restrictions on 
free  trade  in natural  gas  and restrictive bilateral agreements  which  could 
interfere with a  pattern of fair and  open competition when  common  carriage is  introduced.  This  raises  a  number  of legal  and political questions, 
including national  sovereignty over  energy policy and  the balance  in this 
respect between Brussels  and Member  State  governments. 
1.4  The  advantages  and  drawbacks  of gas  common  carriage would depend  to  a 
large degree  on  the  way  in which  that system is defined,  the context  (gas 
supply situation)  into which it is introduced,  the way  in which  the  system 
is regulated and  the  manner  in which  the  main market players react  to  the 
new  business  environment.  For  the  Commission,  this means  that there  a 
number  of key  issues  to be  addressed regarding: 
(a)  the kind of common  carriage  system which might be  introduced; 
(b)  the  manner  of its introduction;  and 
(c)  the  way  in which it is regulated. 
1.5  In the  light of these considerations,  this executive  summary  sets 
out: 
(a)  key  features  of the  European gas  industry which must be  taken into 
account when  considering gas  common  carriage; 
(b)  the  main potential advantages  and drawbacks  of a  gas  common  carriage 
system within the  Community;  and 
(c)  the principal issues of implementation policy which would need  to be 
addressed in order  to  maximise  the potential advantages  and minimise 
the  drawbacks  of such  a  system  in practice. 
II  Ibe  European  gas  industry 
2.1  The  European gas  industry is characterised by  a  series of de  jure or 
de  facto  monopolies  at the national,  regional or local level.  There  is 
practically no  gas-to-gas  competition anywhere  within the  Community,  but 
gas  is ultimately substitutable by other fuels  in practically all its end 
uses  and often faces  intense  inter-fuel competition for bulk industrial 
applications, 'especially from heavy fuel oil. 
2.2  Gas  is typically sold to  consumers  at prices which broadly reflect 
its market value  against competing fuels,  subject  to  the constraint of 
covering  the  costs of supply.  This  is  in marked contrast to  the situation 
in the  power  sector,  where  many  end-users  are  effectively "captive"  to 
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electricity,  regulation is essential and,  therefore,  output  is generally 
priced on  the basis of cost.  Gas  pricing systems  do,  however,  vary  among 
Member  States  and  include both tariff systems  which  are  subject  to close 
Government  scrutiny and  individual  commercial  negotiation of large user gas 
prices,  as  in the  UK  and West  Germany. 
2.3  For  sales  from  transmission to distribution companies,  the basis of 
pricing is rather different.  This  usually reflects  the  competing 
fuel  (often gas  oil) prices  faced by distributors  in selling to  smaller 
residential and  commercial  customers,  less  a  margin for distribution costs 
and profits.  The  responsibility for providing appropriate  gas  supply 
security,  flexibility and quality typically falls mainly  on  the 
transmission companies.  Many  local distributors are not required to make 
contractual take-or-pay or capacity commitments  and  they effectively 
receive all the  gas  they need on a  daily basis  from  their transmission 
company  suppliers.  In general,  ~heir trading margins  appear  to be  fairly 
well protected against  low prices by their gas  purchase  arrangements with 
the  transmission companies  and  an argument  could be  made  that there  is not 
sufficient incentive,  in some  cases,  to minimise  their own  costs or the 
capacity costs  they  impose  on  the  gas  system as  a  whole. 
2.4  There  are  a  number  of statutory monopolies,  restrictions,  special or 
exclusive rights  and other legal barriers  to  internal trade  in natural gas 
within the  Community.  These  include priority treatment for national 
companies  in exploration and production  (as with AGIP  in Italy),  rights of 
"first refusal"  over  indigenous  gas  production  (as with Gasunie  in the 
Netherlands  or  SNAM  in Italy),  exclusive  rights  to  import,  export or 
transport  gas  over  long distances  (Belgium,  France  and Denmark),  local 
monopoly  concessions  over  gas  distribution  (most Member  States)  and 
restrictions  on  the  export of indigenous  gas  production  (as with  the  UK 
"landing requirement").  In the  much  changed circumstances  of the  current 
gas  market,  the  1975  European Council Directive  on  the  use  of gas  in power 
stations could also be  considered an  inappropriate restriction on  the  free 
circulation of gas within the  Community.  There  are also bilateral 
contracts which might be  considered restrictive,  such as  the  exclusive 
supply contract between Gasunie  and  VEGIN  in the Netherlands  or  the 
demarcation contracts  agreed between West  German  transmission companies, 
which effectively divide  the  country into  a  number  of regional  supply 
areas. 2.5  The  only Member  State which has  existing gas  common  carriage 
obligations of any  significance  is  the United Kingdom.  Introduced  in 1982, 
this  system was  refined and given regulatory "teeth"  in 1986;  common 
carriage negotiations  are  underway between British Gas  and various  third 
parties,  but  there  is as  yet no  third party use  of the British Gas  system. 
In continental  Europe,  there  are  a  number  of major joint venture pipelines 
which are used to  transport gas  over  long distances  on behalf of the 
pipeline owners,  who  are  generally gas  transmission companies.  In other 
cases,  gas  in transit is  transported on  a  tariff basis  for  third parties 
under voluntary commercial  agreements  between the pipeline  owner  and  the 
third party.  Transit transportation of this kind is almost exclusively 
provided for other  gas utilities and not for  large  gas  consumers. 
2.6  The  gas  supply situation in the  Community  is very different from  that 
in the United States  and  any  attempt  to  transfer lessons  too directly from 
U.S.  experience of open access  gas  transportation is likely to mislead. 
While  the U.S.  is  95%  self-sufficient in gas  supplies,  the  Community  as  a 
whole  is projected to  be  40%  dependent  on outside gas  sources by  the  end of 
the  century and  in certain Member  States  the  dependence  on third countries 
is significantly higher.  The  U.S.  has  several  thousand small producers  of 
natural  gas,  with strong individual  interests  in getting their gas  to 
market,  and no  producer accounts  for more  than about  5%  of total sales.  By 
contrast,  gas  supplies  to continental Western  Europe  are  dominated by only 
four  large suppliers  - Nederlandse Gasunie,  Algeria,  the  USSR  and Norway. 
In the  latter case,  gas  owned  by  a  variety of producing oil companies  is 
increasingly marketed by  a  Statoil-led group of Norwegian producers. 
Turning to  the physical capacity  to market  incremental volumes  through 
third party transportation,  falling U.S.  gas  demand  has  left considerable 
spare pipeline capacity;  this is not  the  case  in Europe,  where  demand  is 
generally continuing  to  grow.  It is  important  to note  that there  is,  in 
the U.S.,  no  statutory obligation to carry gas  for  third parties;  open 
access  transportation was  voluntarily offered by pipeline companies  in 
response  to market pressures arising from  a  "gas bubble"  of shut-in 
production.  Gas  supplies  to  the  Community  could also be  stepped up 
considerably  - primarily from  non-Community  sources.  However,  the  degree 
of competition between pipelines  for  long distance  transportation is much 
less  than in the  U.S.  and  third party transportation for direct marketing 
is unlikely to be  offered voluntarily. 
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• 2.7  Almost all gas  supplies  to  the  Community  are bought  on  the basis of 
long-term contracts with a  substantial  "take-or-pay"  commitment  from  the 
buyer.  The  purpose  of take-or-pay is  to assure  the  producer of a 
reasonable return on high cost gas  field and pipeline facilities.  Many 
continental gas  transmission companies  have  already bought all or most  of 
the  gas  they need  to  meet  projected demand  through  to  2000  and beyond, 
typically on  the basis of an  80%  or  85%  annual  take-or-pay commitment. 
While  buyers  generally take  the risk of a  decline  in the  overall market  for 
gas,  gas  purchase prices are  frequently renegotiated every three years  and 
in such cases  the  producer bears  the price risk.  Typically,  the producer's 
margin is  squeezed when  oil prices are  low  and  expands  when  oil prices  are 
high.  By  contrast,  transmission companies  tend  to  seek a  fairly steady 
trading margin,  while maintaining a  level of sales consistent with  their 
purchase  contract  take-or-pay obligations. 
III  Advantaies  and  drawbacks  of common  carriage 
3.1  The  major potential advantages  for  the  Community  of a  gas  common 
carriage system include: 
(a)  the possibility that a  more  competitive environment will lead to 
reduced gas  prices,  especially for  large  industrial users who  might 
be  able  to purchase  gas  direct from  producers via common  carriage. 
Advantages  could arise either from  lower  gas  purchase prices or from 
a  reduced non-gas  element  (see under b  below).  Whether  even large 
users  would be  able  to buy  gas  at border prices much  below  those  paid 
by existing gas utilities is,  however,  highly uncertain.  In any 
event,  the  number  of consumers  both willing and able  to conclude 
direct purchase  and  common  carriage deals  in the  short  to medium  term 
would almost certainly be  quite  small; 
(b)  a  chance  for  industrial users  who  are currently high-margin customers 
to  cue  their costs by buying direct.  Even if they cannot secure  a 
lower border price  than that paid by their current transmission 
company  supplier,  a  reasonable  carriage charge  might still be  lower 
than  the  transmission company's  gross  margin on  the  sale.  This  could 
contribute  to  reducing existing gas  price differences  as  between 
comparable  industrial consumers,  both within and between Member 
States; (c)  some  increased pressure  on  gas utilities to  reduce  overheads  and 
operate  more  efficiently,  in order  to be  able  to  compete  against 
actual or potential direct marketing by producers.  This  is a 
difficult benefit to quantify but we  consider  that  the  overall  impact 
is unlikely  to be  great since non-gas  expenses  are  a  small proportion 
of utilities'  total costs,  especially at the  transmission level; 
(d)  an  increase  in gas  purchase  options  for  new  gas-fired power stations. 
Competition between gas  suppliers  in this market could help provide 
new  low cost sources  of electricity generation,  with benefits  to 
small  as  well  as  large electricity consumers.  We  do  not believe  that 
common  carriage  is a  necessary condition for  the  development of 
further  gas  use  in efficient,  combined cycle stations.  This 
development  may,  however,  be more  extensive  in an open,  competitive 
gas  market  and  in turn provides  new  opportunities for competition in 
gas  supply  to  take place.  In this context,  the  Commission might wish 
to  reconsider whether  the  1975  Council Directive  on  the use  of gas  in 
power  stations is still appropriate  in the present energy situation; 
and 
(e)  an  increase  in gas  export options  for  UK  producers  who  are not able 
to develop  their reserves  for  sale to  BG  in a  timely manner,  thus 
making it more  likely that a  cross-channel pipeline would be 
developed to  link the  Community's  largest gas  market with the 
integrated European grid.  This  could  then enhance  the  security of 
gas  supplies within the  Community  as  a  whole. 
3.2  The  most  important potential drawbacks  for  the  Community  of a  gas 
common  carriage  system appear  to be: 
(a)  the  danger  that  the addition of new  gas  buyers  in the market might 
lead to  competitive  "bidding up"  of bulk gas  purchase prices.  This 
appears  rather unlikely in today's  "buyer's market"  conditions,  but 
the position could conceivably change  in future  in the event that 
energy shortages  were  thought  likely.  However,  substantial new  gas 
discoveries  internationally and  a  fall  in the  rate of gas  demand 
growth  suggest  a  reduced likelihood of general  gas  shortage  in Europe 
for  some  time  to  come; • 
(b)  a  possible  increase  in gas  prices  to  smaller  consumers  who  are  not 
themselves  in a  position to purchase  gas  direct from  the  producers. 
This  could arise if gas  utilities lose  customers  to  competition via 
common  carriage  and  the  revenue  loss  is not  fully offset by earnings 
from  providing  common  carriage services  to  third parties.  These 
utilities could then seek to  recover a  higher proportion of their 
fixed costs  (particularly gas  purchase  contract minimum  bills)  from 
remaining  customers.  Some  consumers will be  protected by  inter-fuel 
competition,  but others may  have  no  economic  alternative to  gas  in 
the  short  term  and  could be vulnerable  to price  increases  in this 
event.  This  is largely a  matter of welfare distribution within the 
Community  rather than a  reduction in total welfare,  but still raises 
matters  of equity which  the  Commission  may  consider  important; 
(c)  the possibility that transmission companies  faced with  increased 
competition,  and  therefore  increased market risk,  might be  reluctant 
to  invest and purchase  gas well  ahead of need as  at present,  or  to 
give  the  same  take-or-pay commitments  to  gas  producers  as  they do 
now.  This  raises  the  important question of any  adverse  long-term 
consequences  for  gas  supply security.  Some  large non-Community 
producers  such  as  the  USSR  or Algeria may  already have  sufficient low 
cost gas  production capacity for  some  worsening of take-or-pay  terms 
in new  contracts to have little effect.  There  could,  however,  be 
more  of a  problem in the case of some  new  North  Sea or non-Community 
LNG  projects  (such as  in Nigeria)  which  require  the very high capital 
costs  to be underwritten by  the buyer.  In the  short to medium  term, 
at least,  our view is that the  impact  of common  carriage on overall 
gas  supply security will be  modest.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission 
might wish  to consider  the possibility of announcing its plans well 
in advance  and phasing in the  right to  common  carriage  in order  to 
minimise uncertainty;  and 
(d)  the possibility of adverse  consequences  for  "new"  or  "infant"  gas 
industries.  Those  Member  States which have still to build up  their 
basic  gas  industry infrastructure might  find  that  the uncertainty 
created by  a  common  carriage right for  large  industrial consumers 
makes  it very difficult to  finance  the  substantial  investments 
required in the early phases  of gas  development.  In view of this, 
9 the  Commission  might  wish  to consider a  temporary  exemption  from  the 
full  common  carriage  system  for  states such  as  Greece,  Ireland, 
Portugal  and  Spain.  Such  an exemption would  only relate  to direct 
sales via common  carriage;  common  carriage for  gas  in transit to 
other Member  States  should be  considered as  a  Community-wide  system, 
even initially,  from  which  there would be  no  exemptions. 
3.3  The  potential advantages  and  drawbacks  outlined above  are  inevitably 
very general  in nature,  since  we  are  seeking to  cover  12  Member  States with 
rather different gas  supply situations.  We  have  also  focused mainly  on  the 
advantages  and  drawbacks  of common  carriage for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
For  reference,  we  set out  in tables  Sl  and  S2  at the  end of this  summary 
some  indications of the  advantages  and drawbacks  for particular classes of 
gas  consumer,  the different players  in the  gas  industry and  the various 
Member  States. 
3.4  The  major direct benefits of common  carriage would accrue  to very 
large  gas  users,  although there  is a  potential for  small electricity 
consumers  to benefit indirectly from  the  competitive pricing of gas  to 
combined cycle  power  stations.  Medium  sized  indu~trial companies  who  could 
not  themselves  purchase direct might nevertheless  form  purchasing consortia 
or buy  through  independent  gas  marketers/traders,  as  in the U.S.  or 
(potentially)  with AGAS  in the  UK. 
3.5  In the  short to medium  term,  we  do  not  expect  the  impact of common 
carriage to be  as  great as  some  proponents  or detractors  appear  to have 
been suggesting.  Even  if common  carriage  is not heavily used,  however, 
there  may  still be  advantages  in the  mere potential for  competition to  take 
place if this  in itself causes modifications  to  restrictive or 
anti-competitive business behaviour.  The  Community  as  a  whole will no 
doubt  face  far-reaching  industrial and energy  demand  changes  over  the 
coming  decades.  In a  general  sense,  therefore,  it may  be  said that an 
open,  flexible  gas  supply system is more  likely to be beneficial  than 
otherwise. 
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IV  General  assessment 
4.1  If the  European  Commission  does  decide  to  pursue  the  introduction of 
a  gas  common  carriage system,  then it is  important  that the  system proposed 
is as  effective,  fair and clearly defined as possible.  In our view,  this 
would  require  the  Commission  to: 
(a)  define  the nature of the  common  carriage obligation on  owners  of gas 
pipelines  and  related facilities  to provide  transportation and other 
services  for  third party users; 
(b)  clarify the  circumstances  in which  the  obligation would apply,  in 
terms  of spare pipeline capacity and  the projected demands  of 
existing gas  customers; 
(c)  consider  announcing  any proposals well  in advance  and phasing in the 
obligation to carry gas  for  competitors  (as  opposed to  gas  in 
transit)  over  a  period of years,  in order to  avoid creating undue 
uncertainty in the market  and  to permit  an orderly transition to more 
open competition without prejudicing reasonable  supply security; 
(d)  consider  a  temporary derogation  from  certain common  carriage 
obligations  in the  case of Member  States at a  very early stage of gas 
development,  in order not  to hinder  the  establishment of an adequate 
pipeline network; 
(e)  consider establishing guidelines  on what  it would  regard as  a 
reasonable basis of charging for  common  carriage,  in order  to  ensure 
that would-be  direct buyers  can assess  the  advantages  of such 
arrangements  before putting at risk their business  relationship with 
existing suppliers; 
(f)  distinguish in these  charging principles between  "firm"  (year  round) 
and  interruptible services; 
(g)  take  into account  the  need  for  obligations  and  charging principles 
in respect of storage  (load factor),  quality adjustment  and back-up 
gas  supply services,  as well  as  transportation itself; 
II (h)  consider an obligation on  gas  companies  and others  to  "publish"  plans 
for  new  pipeline development,  in order  to  allow third parties• 
capacity requirements  to  be  taken into account; 
(i)  consider  the  regulation required to  "police"  a  common  carriage 
system,  taking  into account  the  complexity of the  gas  industry within 
the  Community,  the desirability of leaving a  role  for  commercial 
negotiation and market  forces  and  the  need  to  avoid an over-rigid and 
bureaucratic  regulatory regime  which  could bring considerable  adverse 
side-effects  in its wake; 
(j)  develop  internal policy positions  in advance  on  a  number  of unfair 
competitive practices  (such as  predatory pricing or unreasonable 
refusal  to  provide  carriage)  and related sanctions,  in order  to 
ensure  "fair competition"  in the new  environment and  to permit  a 
rapid response  to  the  likely increase  in complaints  that would  follow 
the  introduction of common  carriage;  and 
(k)  review  the  resources,  expertise  and procedures  available  to  the 
Commission  for  regulating a  more  competitive  gas  industry and 
consider whether  a  special body with delegated powers  is required  to 
exercise  this role.  The  Commission might also wish  to consider  the 
possibility of delegating  some  authority to  the  Member  States,  taking 
into account  the  need  to  ensure  consistent application and 
enforcement of  the  common  carriage  system. 
4.2  Our  view  is  that a  series of standard carriage tariffs is most 
unlikely to  do  justice to  the  complexities  of the  European gas  supply 
situation and would probably lead to  anomalies,  inequities, 
protracted disputes  and  cumbersome  over-regulation.  We  therefore 
recommend  that carriage negotiations be  left,  as  far  as  possible,  in 
the  commercial  arena,  with  the  Commission  intervening in the  event of 
abuse.  On  the  other hand,  an obligation to  carry  gas  with no  related 
guidelines  on  charging may  well be  ineffective  - in that potential 
users would have  no  assurance  of a  reasonable  deal  - and would also 
raise  the  danger  that ad hoc  intervention could set inappropriate 
\l ' 
I 
general precedents.  Our  strong recommendation would  therefore be 
that,  if the  Commission  does  want  a  gas  common  carriage  system,  it 
should ensure  that clear,  published principles  are  laid out  in 
advance  and  that it is  then equipped  to  apply and  enforce  these 
principles  in a  complex  industry. 
4.3  If the  Commission wishes  to pursue  the  introduction of a  gas  common 
carriage  system  - whether  through  new  legislation or otherwise  - we  suggest 
that it should consider undertaking further studies  to  identify more 
precisely:-
the various  steps  to be  taken to  introduce  such  a  system; 
the appropriate nature of the  legal  and  regulatory regime;  and 
the  institutional arrangements  (including staff resources)  required 
to apply  the  regime  and  resolve  the  disputes which would undoubtedly 
arise. Table  Sl 
Advantages  and  drawbacks  of common  carriage  for  the  gas  industry and  gas 
consumers 
SMALL  GAS 
CONSUMERS 
LARGE  INDUSTRIAL 
GAS  CONSUMERS 
GAS-FIRED 
POWER  STATIONS 
GAS  DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANIES 
Generally unable  to  take  direct 
advantage  of common  carriage.  Dependent 
for benefits  on distributors buying 
direct and passing on part of any  gains. 
May  suffer adverse  consequences  if 
transmission companies  who  lose 
industrial load to competition seek to 
pass  more  costs  on  to  smaller users. 
Probably need  to be very large  to buy 
direct but could make  use  of independent 
traders  (as  in the US).  Benefits  depend 
largely on negotiating lower purchase 
prices or undercutting gas utilities' 
trading margins. 
Combined  cycle plant especially well 
placed to buy direct  (potentially high 
load factor,  located on  the high-pressure 
grid and  able  to  commit  to  long-term 
contracts).  The  competition between gas 
utilities and  direct suppliers  is likely 
to  put downward  pressure  on gas  costs  for 
generation. 
Poor  load factor,  little storage of their 
own,  specific quality requirements, 
often bear  limited price or 
market  risk at present.  Relatively 
few  appear  likely to be willing and  able 
to  buy direct. 
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GAS  TRANSMISSION 
COMPANIES 
COMMUNITY  GAS 
PRODUCERS 
Table  Sl  (ctd) 
Threatened with  loss of load  to direct 
marketing or a  reduction in margins. 
Danger  of incurring gas  purchase  contract 
take-or-pay penalties  is a  particular 
threat.  Nevertheless  in a  strong 
position to  compete  against new  entrants 
and  to adapt  to carriage  as  a  profitable 
activity if forced  to  do  so. 
Opportunities  limited for  most  producers 
(other  than UK)  as  a  result of limited 
exploration prospects,  small fields  and 
marginal  economics.  Common  carriage may 
be  more  of a  threat  than an opportunity, 
though  the  advantages  of secure 
indigenous  supply  and  long  term  scope  for 
tax regime  changes  if necessary make  it 
unlikely that common  carriage would 
seriously erode  the  level of Community 
gas  production. 
IS Table  S2 
Particular factors  influencing  the  impact  of common  carriage  on different 
Member  States 
BELGIUM: 
DENMARK: 
FRANCE: 
GREECE: 
current  tendency  to  over-supply makes 
Distrigaz vulnerable  to  loss of market  to 
competition via common  carriage.  Slower 
than expected demand  growth  may  mean  some 
spare pipeline capacity available  for 
direct sales.  Intercom/Tractabel 
interests  in both Distrigaz  and 
distribution may  make  direct buying by 
distributors  less  likely.  The  USSR  is 
not  a  Distrigaz supplier and is a 
potential source  of direct sales  to 
Belgian consumers. 
a  large buyer may  be necessary to justify 
a  gas  export link from  Norway  and  this 
makes  direct purchasing less  likely. 
Dangas  could conceivably try to sell 
direct to  large  industrial users  who  are 
currently supplied by  the distributors. 
current  tendency  to over-supply makes  GdF 
vulnerable  to  loss  of load  to  competition 
from  direct sales.  Vertically integrated 
industry precludes direct purchasing by 
other utilities,  except possibly Elf on 
behalf of SNGSO/CeFeM. 
currently no  natural  gas  industry,  but 
plans  to  import  from  USSR  and 
Algeria.  Likely  to  remain geographically 
isolated from  the  rest of the  Community 
gas  grid for  some  time  to  come.  Direct 
purchases  by  large  consumers  could damage 
gas  industry development,  though  the 
strong role of the  public sector 
currently makes  direct buying unlikely. 
lb 
.  , IRELAND: 
ITALY: 
LUXEMBOURG: 
NETHERLANDS: 
.. 
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Table  S2  (ctd) 
currently isolated from  other Member 
States'  gas  grids.  Direct buying by 
consumers  is rather unlikely.  In  the 
longer  term,  the  common  carriage option 
through Great Britain could give  BGE  a 
choice  of  imported gas  suppliers  (UK  or 
Norway)  in the event  that  indigenous 
reserves  are not  adequate. 
strong state  (ENI)  involvement at all 
levels of the  gas  industry and  in the 
power  sector  (ENEL)  could make  the  use  of 
common  carriage less likely.  Independent 
producers  of indigenous  gas  might be 
interested to sell gas  direct to 
consumers  on  the  SNAM  grid,  but this 
would be  small  scale.  Norway  does  not 
currently supply  to  Italy,  but  the 
distance  may  be  a  barrier to direct 
purchasing  from  this  source. 
the main industrial consumer  (the  steel 
industry)  participates in SOTEG  and  this 
makes  direct purchasing less  likely. 
as  an exporter,  Gasunie  is unlikely  to 
make  use  of common  carriage,  since it is 
not  looking  to  expand sales.  Low  cost 
Groningen production should enable 
Gasunie  to  compete  with potential direct 
sales  into  the home  market,  provided the 
approach  to  gas  pricing is flexible. PORTUGAL: 
SPAIN: 
UNITED  KINGDOM: 
WEST  GERMANY: 
Table  S2  (ctd) 
no  gas  industry as  yet;  the possibility 
of common  carriage could pose  a  threat to 
its development,  as  additional market 
uncertainty would  surround the 
substantial investment required in grid 
construction. 
the  right of large users  to buy direct 
could have  a  detrimental effect on  a  gas 
industry which  is still in the fairly 
early stages  of development. 
common  carriage  system already exists  and 
there  are  signs  that some  new  gas-fired 
power  stations  and  other  industrial users 
may  seek to buy direct.  Common  carriage 
elsewhere  in the  Community  could make  UK 
gas  exports more  likely in the  longer 
' 
term. 
at the  centre of the  European gas  grid. 
May  be  among  the  Member  States most 
affected by  common  carriage,  whether  for 
sales  into  the  West  German  market  or  for 
transit.  High margin  industrial users 
may  be  interested to  explore  carriage 
opportunities.  Regional  transmission 
companies  might possibly buy direct 
if their existing terms  of supply are not 
regarded as  satisfactory. 
~ 
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